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The Battered Wife's Dilemma: To Kill or
To Be Killed
By Loraine Patricia Eber*
It is well documented that wife battering1 is an extremely
widespread and serious problem. Because wife beating goes largely
unreported,2 exact statistics on the number of incidents are un-
available; however, it is estimated to affect as many as forty mil-
lion women.3 In California, for example, fifty percent of all married
women will be assaulted by their husbands during the course of
their marriages.4 Even the California Legislature acknowledges
that hundreds of thousands of women in California are regularly
beaten. 5 Furthermore, wife beating often is perpetuated from gen-
* B.A., 1978, San Francisco State University. Member, Third Year Class.
1. This Note addresses the problems of wife battering rather than spousal abuse in
general. Husband beating presents somewhat different issues from wife beating and does not
have the same historical acceptance as wife beating. Although this Note does not discuss the
problem, its existence should be acknowledged. See San Francisco Chronicle, Oct. 28, 1980,
at 6, col. 1.
2. Domestic Violence: Hearings Before the California Senate Comm. on Judiciary 48
(1978) (testimony of Burt Pines, Los Angeles City Attorney) [hereinafter cited as 1978
Hearings]; Note, The Battered Wife Syndrome: A Potential Defense to a Homicide Charge,
6 PEPPRDINE L. Rzv. 213, 213 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Potential Defense]; Note, The
Case For Legal Remedies For Abused Women, 6 N.Y.U. Rxv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 135, 136
(1977) [hereinafter cited as Remedies For Abused Women].
3. Meyers, Battered Wives, Dead Husbands, STUDsrr LAWYER, March 1978, at 47
(notes estimates that range from 3,000,000 to 40,000,000). Cf. California Advisory Comm'n
on Family Law, Domestic Violence app. F, at 119 (1st report 1978) [hereinafter cited as
Domestic Violence] (sets figure at 1,000,000); Remedies For Abused Women, supra note 2,
at 136-37 (cites figures ranging from 1,000,000 to 28,000,000). These figures vary considera-
bly because they involve approximations of the number of unreported incidents.
4. CALiFoRNIA DPAnTMENT OF JusTicE, HANDBOOK ON DosTc VIoLENcE 2 (3rd ed.
1979) [hereinafter cited as HANDBooK]. See also Note, Does Wife Abuse Justify Homicidel,
24 WAYNE L. Rav. 1705, 1706 (1978).
5. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 18290 (West 1980) (repealed June 30, 1980). See
also Marital & Family Violence: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Nutrition & Human
Needs of the California Senate Comm. on Health & Welfare 16 (1975) (testimony of Del
Martin, member Victims of Crimes Subcomm., Citizens Safety Task Force, City of San
Francisco) [hereinafter cited as 1975 Hearings].
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eration to generation6 and is common to all socioeconomic classes.7
Despite the fact that wife beating is such a critical problem,8 the
law has all but ignored it.9
This Note first explores the historical acceptance of wife beat-
ing, with particular emphasis on the traditional concepts of marital
privacy and wives as their husbands' property. Next, sociological
studies 0 dealing with why men beat their wives are discussed to
demonstrate that because science is unable to predict which men
will become wifebeaters, such beatings cannot be prevented. Simi-
lar studies with regard to why battered women stay with their abu-
sive husbands help explain why leaving is not a viable option for
these women.
6. "Boys who have seen their fathers beat their mothers.. . are likely to grow up to
become battering men also." HANDBOOK, supra note 4, at 3. See also D. MARTIN, BATTERED
Wivns 51 (1976) [hereinafter cited as MARTIN]; BATTERED WOMEN 60, 77 (M. Roy ed. 1977)
[hereinafter cited as Roy]; 1978 Hearings, supra note 2, at 70 (testimony of Judge Norbert
Ehrenfreund, Superior Court of San Diego).
7. A study done in Norwalk, Connecticut, a predominantly middle class community,
revealed that police there receive roughly the same number of wife abuse complaints as do
law enforcement officials in a Harlem district of comparable size. Barden, Wife Beaters:
Few of Them Ever Appear Before a Court of Law, New York Times, Oct. 21, 1974, at 38,
col. 1. A 1970 study concluded that the middle class is more prone to commit the offense of
assault than the poor. Stark & McEvoy, Middle Class Violence, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY, Nov.
1970, at 30-31. The reasons for not reporting domestic violence differ depending on where
the victim lives. According to one author, women in cities do not report domestic violence
because they think that the police will do nothing and because they fear retaliation, while
women who live in the suburbs do not call the police because they do not want their neigh-
bors to learn of the violence. Note, Does Wife Abuse Justify Homicide?, 24 WAYNE L. REv.
1705, 1707 n.17 (1978).
8. The seriousness of wife beating is illustrated by recent crime statistics. In 1978,
murders between husband and wife and between boyfriend and girlfriend accounted for ap-
proximately 13% of all murders. FBI, CRIMP IN THE U.S. 1978, at 9 (1978). One out of every
five murder victims is related to the offender. Id. at 13. The figure may actually be higher
because the relationship was unknown in 30.1% of the murders. Id. at 9. See also Roy,
supra note 6, at 153-54. According to 1975 statistics, the wife is the victim in 52% of spouse
murders.
9. For example, police departments usually do not keep separate statistics on wife bat-
tering, indicating the low priority assigned to the problem. See Domestic Violence, supra
note 3, at 122; Eisenberg & Micklow, The Assaulted Wife: "Catch 22" Revisited, 3 Wo-
MEN'S RTS. L. REP. 138, 140 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Eisenberg & Micklow]; Potential
Defense, supra note 2, at 213. See also MARTIN, supra note 6, at 10-11 (police officers re-
sponding to domestic disturbances often do not file reports).
10. See generally T. DAVmSON, CONJUGAL CRME (1978); MARTIN, supra note 6; Eisen-
berg & Micklow, supra note 9; Parnas, Judicial Response to Intra-Family Violence, 54
MINN. L. REv. 585 (1970); Truninger, Marital Violence: The Legal Solutions, 23 HASTINGS
L.J. 259 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Truninger]; BANNON, LAW ENFORCEMENT PROBLEMS
WITH INTRA-FAMILY VIOLENCE (1975) (transcript of speech given at American Bar Associa-
tion Convention) [hereinafter cited as BANNON].
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The remainder of the Note evaluates the manner in which the
legal system has evaded its responsibility to treat this critical prob-
lem as a crime against society. Generally, the criminal remedies
that are theoretically available to redress the problem are ineffec-
tive because of the reluctance of the police and district attorneys
to get involved in family violence. Other remedies, such as tempo-
rary restraining orders, diversion programs, and shelters provide
some aid to battered women, but their effectiveness could be
improved.
Finally, the Note concludes that the sociological and legal ac-
ceptance of wife beating must be considered in cases where bat-
tered women are charged with the killing of their husbands and are
pleading self-defense. More specifically, all of these circumstances
are relevant to an evaluation of the battered woman's perception of
the immediacy of the danger and the necessity of using deadly
force.
Historical and Sociological Background
Historical Acceptance
Historically, because of the concepts of marital privacy 1 and
wives as their husbands' property,12 the law has refused to step in
and attach criminal penalties for wife beating. The, rationale has
been that protecting the privacy of the marital relationship should
take precedence over any concern for the wife's safety. Addition-
ally, the property notion that husbands can treat their wives as
11. See Eisenberg & Seymour, The Self-Defense Plea and Battered Women, TRAIL,
July 1978, at 35; Potential Defense, supra note 2, at 214; Remedies For Abused Women,
supra note 2, at 135-36. For a good historical perspective on the problem, see generally T.
DAVDSON, CONJUGAL CRimE 95-130 (1978); Roy, supra note 6, at 2-23.
12. See, e.g., 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COUMNTAraES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND, at 444
(1765) ("For as he [the husband] is to answer for her misbehavior, the law thought it rea-
sonable to intrust him with this power of restraining her, by domestic chastisement, in the
same moderation that a man is allowed to correct his apprentices or his children."). Senti-
ments such as this one codified by Napolean illustrate the extent of this historical accept-
ance: "Women, like walnut trees, should be beaten every day." Warrior, Battered Lives, in
HOUSEWORKER'S HANDBOOK 16 (1975). See also Eisenberg & Micklow, supra note 9, at 138
("A wife isn't a jug.., she won't crack if you hit her a few times."--Old Russian proverb).
A concept somewhat analogous to the concept of wives as their husbands' property is the
"marital merger of identity"--that a wife loses her identity to her husband at marriage. See
Powers, Sex Segregation and the Ambivalent Directions of Sex Discrimination Law, 1979
Wis. L. Rhv. 55, 74-75. The author also mentions that husbands are immunized from rape
prosecutions by their wives in most states. Id. at 75 n.9.
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they see fit historically has caused the legal system to ignore wife
battering. The following cases illustrate the way in which courts
have used the concepts of marital privacy and wives as their hus-
bands' property to ignore the problem of wife beating.
Legal recognition of the criminal nature of wife abuse came
slowly. In 1824, the Mississippi Supreme Court held that a hus-
band may be convicted for an assault upon his wife, in contraven-
tion of established common law.13 However, the court continued to
allow a husband to beat his wife when circumstances warranted:
"let the husband be permitted to exercise the right of moderate
chastisement, in cases of great emergency, and use salutary re-
straints in every case of misbehavior, without being subject to vex-
atious prosecutions .. ". ."I" The Mississippi court used a privacy
rationale to allow the husband to inflict "moderate chastise-
ment." 5 Any real consideration of the physical harm suffered by
the married woman was outweighed by the court's desire to keep
private what happened within the confines of the marital home. In
short, the court was willing to ignore the wife's physical injuries to
uphold the value of marital privacy.
In State v. Rhodes,18 the Supreme Court of North Carolina
reiterated this theme, holding that a husband would not be con-
victed for "moderate correction"17 of his wife. Again, the court
weighed "the evils which would result from raising the curtain, and
exposing to public curiosity and criticism, the nursery and the bed
chamber"1 8 against the infliction of "moderate" force upon the
wife and held that the interest of protecting marital privacy was
paramount.
As late as 1874, the North Carolina court, although clearly
stating that a husband had no legal right to chastise his wife under
13. Bradley v. State, 1 Miss. (1 Walker) 156 (1824).
14. Id. at 158.
15. Id. "Family broils and dissentions cannot be investigated before the tribunals of
the country, without casting a shadow over the character of those who are unfortunately
engaged in the controversy." Id. The court reasoned that the vexatious prosecution would
result in the "mutual discredit and shame of all parties concerned." Id.
16. 61 N.C. (Phil. Law) 445 (1868).
17. Id. at 450. The court defined "moderate correction" in terms of situations in which
"permanent or malicious injury" is not inflicted or threatened. Id. at 448. In Rhodes the
court found that the attack by the husband was unprovoked. Id. at 446.
18. Id. at 448. The court stated that "family government is recognized by law as being
complete in itself as the State government is in itself. . . ." Id.
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any circumstances, accepted a similar privacy argument.19 Stating
that it would not "listen to trivial complaints," the court preferred
to "draw the curtain, shut out the public gaze, and leave the par-
ties to forget and forgive."2
Although it is clear that husbands no longer enjoy a legal priv-
ilege to beat their wives, the concepts of marital privacy 21 and
wives as their husbands' property continue to influence the atti-
tudes of police departments and prosecutors and to militate
against the recognition that wife beating is a criminal offense.22
These misconceptions also affect battered women's perceptions of
themselves and their possible options in the battering situation.23
Why Men Beat Their Wives
It is easy to theorize that men beat their wives simply because
they have been socialized to use violence to solve problems and
their wives provide a convenient, relatively risk-free outlet for
their frustrations. Cultural conditioning, however, fails to explain
fully why some men beat their wives while others do not. Several
studies have postulated interesting, but highly questionable,
explanations.
Two of the earliest analyses of the problem place the blame
with the wives or mothers rather than with the wife beaters. One
study, conducted by three psychiatrists, 24 described the wives as
"aggressive, efficient, masculine and sexually frigid," while they
termed the husbands "shy, sexually ineffectual, reasonably hard
working, 'mother's boys.' ' '25 The study's conclusion centered
around these husband-wife personality types:
The periods of violent behavior by the husband served to release
19. State v. Oliver, 70 N.C. 60, 61 (1874). The court also criticized the "rule of thumb"
that allowed a husband to beat hi wife with a switch as long as it was no thicker than his
thumb. Id.
20. Id. at 61-62. This triviality argument was also raised in State v. Rhodes, 61 N.C.
(Phil. Law) 445, 448 (1868).
21. The United States Supreme Court specifically subordinated this marital privacy
interest in Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40 (1980), holding that an accused husband
may not invoke the privilege against adverse spousal testimony so as to exclude the volun-
tary testimony of his wife.
22. See text accompanying notes 64-91, 97-105 infra.
23. See text accompanying notes 38-46 infra.
24. Snell, Rosenwald & Robey, The Wifebeater's Wife, 11 ARCHIVES OF GENERAL
PSYCH. 107 (1964). The study concerned 37 men who had been charged with assaulting and
battering their wives.
25. Id. at 111.
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him momentarily from his anxiety about his ineffectiveness as a
man, while, at the same time, giving his wife apparent masochis-
tic gratification and helping probably to deal with the guilt aris-
ing from the intense hostility expressed in her controlling, cas-
trating behavior.2
6
Apparently, the researchers assumed that simply because the wives
did not possess stereotypical female traits, they enjoyed being
beaten. Although this study is revealing as far as the bias of the
doctors is concerned, it offers no rational analysis of the wife bat-
tering syndrome.
Similar results were reached in another study.28 The assail-
ants' mothers were characterized as "domineering" and "re-
jecting." '29 The researcher hypothesized that when an assailant
married he transferred his dependence from his mother to his wife.
When his dependency needs were not met, the man responded
with violence.30 Again the wives were labeled as "masculine, out-
spoken, domineering women."31 Just as in the study conducted by
the psychiatrists, the women were blamed for not fitting into the
stereotypical passive, dependent female role.
More recent analyses of why men beat their wives have cen-
tered on identifying factors that tend to instigate the violence
rather than on a psychological analysis of the wife beater.32 Factors
that have been recognized as precipitants of domestic violence in-
clude: arguments over money,38 jealousy, '3 4 sexual problems, 85 alco-
26. Id.
27. The fallacy of this "masochistic gratification" argument is evident when the analy-
sis is applied to child abuse. The argument would be that the abused child is relieved from
guilt caused by his or her hostility toward the parents while the parents are released from
their anxiety as inadequate parents when the child is beaten. The rationale is no less ludi-
crous in the battered wife setting.
28. Schultz, The Wife Assaulter, 6 J. Soc. THERAPY 103 (1960). Leroy Schultz, a pro-
bation officer, conducted this study of four men who had been convicted of assaulting their
wives with intent to kill. Id.
29. Id. at 107.
30. Id. at 108.
31. Id.
32. In one such study, Maria Roy analyzed a sample of 150 women who called Abused
Women's Aid in Crisis (a New York service program for battered women) in 1976. The data
was derived from intake questionnaires and supplemented by followup interviews. Roy,
supra note 6, at 25.
33. Id. at 40-41.
34. See MARTIN, supra note 6, at 58-61; Eisenberg & Micklow, supra note 9, at 144.
35. Roy, supra note 6, at 41.
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hol or drugs," and disputes over children.37
Many elements thus coalesce to create an environment condu-
cive to wife battering. The question of why men beat their wives
will remain essentially unanswered, however, until more is under-
stood about personality development. Because potential wife beat-
ers cannot be identified in advance, it is virtually impossible to
prevent the onset of the violence. Therefore, effective remedies to
curtail the beatings as soon as possible are of critical importance.
Why Battered Women Stay
Just as there is no ready, simplistic reason why men beat their
wives, there is no easy answer to why battered women stay with
their abusive husbands. Emotional dependency has been suggested
as a primary reason. Often a battered woman is not only emotion-
ally dependent on her assailant but also on the marriage itself.38
The sex-role conditioning that leads wives to bear the burden for
the success of the marriage often causes the battered wife to feel
guilty about the beatings and to give her husband innumerable
second chances.3 t
Low self-esteem and fear of their husbands frequently charac-
terize battered women and force them to stay with their battering
husbands. Some women even feel that somehow they must deserve
the beatings.40 Shame is a common emotion among battered wo-
men and keeps them from taking the steps necessary to extricate
themselves from the situation.41 Others are trapped in the abusive
environment because they do not feel confident enough to reach
out to persons who may be able to help them with their problems.
Moreover, many wives justifiably fear reprisals from their angry
36. See MARTIN, supra note 6, at 56; Eisenberg & Micklow, supra note 9, at 144.
37. Roy, supra note 6, at 42. Roy also found that 81.1% of the husbands who battered
their wives bad experienced or witnessed violence in their homes as children. Id. at 30-31.
38. MARTIN, supra note 6, at 82. See also HANDBOOK, supra note 4, at 4; Roy, supra
note 6, at 115.
39. MARTIN, supra note 6, at 81-82. See also T. DAVIDSON, CONJUGAL CRIME 63-64
(1978) (wives as caretakers).
40. Roy, supra note 6, at 81-82. See also HANDBOOK, supra note 4, at 4 (wife believed
that she was at fault and had no personal worth). But see Eisenberg & Micklow, supra note
9, at 144 (75% of the wives said that they had done nothing to deserve the beating).
41. Search, London: Battered Wives, Ms., June 1974, at 24. See also Gingold, One of
These Days-Pow! Right in the Kisser: The Truth About Battered Wives, Ms., Aug. 1976,
at 52 [hereinafter cited as Gingold].
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husbands if they leave or even call the police.42
Economic dependency often eliminates any possibility of leav-
ing. Many married women have no marketable skills, particularly
if they have been raising children for many years.43 One study
found that seventy-five percent of battered wives who had left
their husbands were unemployed." Some of these women may
have small children and be unable to work because child care is
not available. In addition, economic dependency can arise because
many women do not have access to the family bank accounts.45
Battered women give assorted reasons for not leaving their
husbands.4 Because these women are emotionally dependent, they
may hold the false hope that their attackers will reform. Some are
afraid to leave because they fear for their safety or the well-being
of their children. Others have no money of their own so they hesi-
tate to leave, particularly with their children. Finally, some women
simply have no place to go because they have no money and are
unaware of the availability of shelters or other free lodging for wo-
men in their situation.
Wife beating remains a very serious problem and a difficult
one to solve. A long history of legal and social legitimization of
men beating their wives is hard to overcome. The absence of any
firm understanding of why men beat their wives makes it impossi-
ble to identify potential wifebeaters in advance and help them
before they resort to violence. The reasons battered women stay
with their husbands are similarly complex and difficult to compre-
hend, particularly because emotional dependency is often involved.
Criminal Remedies
One possible option for a battered wife is to have her husband
arrested and prosecuted for his beatings. All states have criminal
statutes that could conceivably be invoked to punish husbands
who beat their wives. In a typical jurisdiction such as California, a
42. See MARTIN, supra note 6, at 76, 78; Eisenberg & Micklow, supra note 9, at 144-45;
Note, Does Wife Abuse Justify Homicide?, 24 WAYNE L. REV. 1705, 1710 (1978).
43. Gingold, supra note 41, at 52. See also HANDBOOK, supra note 4, at 4; MARTM,
supra note 6, at 83-85.
44. Note, Does Wife Abuse Justify Homicide?, 24 WAYNE L. REV. 1705, 1709 (1978).
45. MARTIn, supra note 6, at 84.
46. Roy, supra note 6, at 31.
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wifebeater could be prosecuted for assault,47 battery,48 assault with
a deadly weapon,49 mayhem,50 disturbing the peace,"' burglary,52
and possession of a deadly weapon with intent to assault.5" In ad-
dition, the California Penal Code contains a section entitled "in-
flicting corporal injury resulting in traumatic condition upon
spouse or person with whom one is cohabiting," which pertains
specifically to wife beating." As demonstrated below, however,
these laws do not work effectively to punish or prevent wife
beating.
Misdemeanor Assault and Battery
Assaults and batteries are misdemeanors, 5  and in California, a
peace officer can arrest on such charges only if a warrant has been
issued or the act was committed in the officer's presence., If a fel-
ony has been committed, a peace officer can arrest even without a
warrant if the officer has "reasonable cause" to believe that a fel-
ony has taken place and that the person to be arrested has com-
mitted it.5' In most instances of wife abuse, the police will not ac-
tually see the beating. The violence is over by the time the police
47. CAL. PENAL CODE § 240 (West 1970). An assault is defined as "an unlawful at-
tempt, coupled with a present ability, to commit a violent injury on the person of another."
Id.
48. Id. § 242. "[A]ny willful and unlawful use of force or violence upon the person of
another" constitutes a battery. Id.
49. Id. § 245.
50. Id. § 203.
51. Id. § 415 (West Supp. 1980).
52. Id. § 459 (West 1970).
53. Id. § 467 (West 1970).
54. Id. § 273.5 (West Supp. 1980). California is exceptional in that no other state has a
felony wife beating statute. In Ohio, the crime of domestic violence is a misdemeanor. OHIo
REv. CODE ANN. § 2919.25 (Page Supp. 1979). Additionally, the Washington Code lists
crimes that constitute domestic violence. WASH. REv CODE ANN. § 10.99.020 (West Supp.
1980).
55. The punishment for assaults and batteries in California is a fine not exceeding
$500 and/or imprisonment in the county jail for up to six months. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 241,
243 (West Supp. 1980). Assault and battery charges are the most common criminal actions
arising out of domestic violence. HANDBOOK, supra note 4, at 19.
56. CAL. PENAL CODE § 836 (West 1970). In Michigan, however, police officers can
make warrantless arrests for domestic violence even if they do not witness the misdemeanor.
MICH. Coap. LAws ANN. § 764.15a(1) (West Supp. 1980). In Ohio, police officers are empow-
ered to make arrests for the misdemeanor of domestic violence if they have reasonable cause
to believe that the person to be arrested has committed the crime. OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2935.03 (Page Supp. 1979).
57. CAL. PENAL CODE § 836 (West 1970).
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arrive; therefore, no misdemeanor arrest can be made. Although a
misdemeanor arrest could nonetheless be made if a warrant is on
file, that option is generally foreclosed because the filing of a war-
rant would have required a trip to the district attorney's office to
file a complaint prior to the incident. When these restrictions are
examined in light of police reluctance to arrest in domestic vio-
lence cases, the ineffectiveness of misdemeanor statutes in prevent-
ing or punishing domestic violence becomes apparent.
Felony Wife Beating
California Penal Code section 273.5 is a felony statute specifi-
cally addressed to the problem of domestic violence. The existence
of this statute indicates that the California Legislature recognizes
wife beating as a critical problem with which the legal system
should be concerned. The statute provides:
Any person who willfully inflicts upon his or her spouse, or any
person who willfully inflicts upon any person of the opposite sex
with whom he or she is cohabiting, corporal injury resulting in a
traumatic condition, is guilty of a felony, and upon conviction
thereof shall be punished by imprisonment in a state prison, or in
a county jail for not more than one year.58
Unfortunately, the prohibition against "inffict[ing] . . . corporal
injury resulting in a traumatic condition" is not well defined in the
statute. In People v. Burns,59 however, the. court defined "corporal
injury" as the "touching of the person of another against his will
with physical force in an intentional, hostile, and aggravated man-
ner, or projecting of such force against his person. '"' The term
"traumatic condition" 1 was defined as "[a]n abnormal condition
of the living body produced by violence," or "an injury or
wound. '6 2 The requirement that the physical force cause an injury
58. Id. § 273.5(a) (West Supp. 1980). Section 273.5, which was enacted in 1977,
changed the previous requirement that the parties be married in order for the law to apply.
The wife beating statute was originally enacted in 1945 as § 273d. See Cal. Stat. 1945, ch.
1312, § 1, at 2462.
59. 88 Cal. App. 2d 867, 200 P.2d 134 (1948).
60. Id. at 873, 200 P.2d at 137.
61. Id. at 874, 200 P.2d at 138. The term "traumatic condition" was held to require
court definition as it is a legal term not within the knowledge of jurors. Id.
62. Id. at 874, 200 P.2d at 137-38. Although the court did not explicitly adopt a defini-
tion of "traumatic condition" it did indicate approval of the definition stated in the text. In
People v. Stewart, 188 Cal. App. 2d 88, 91, 10 Cal. Rptr. 217, 219 (1961), the court adopted a
similar definition: "a wound or other abnormal bodily condition resulting from some exter-
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or wound is often problematic because many women are unaware
of the need to document the evidence of physical abuse. Further,
wifebeaters often hit their wives in places where bruises are not
readily visible; 3 thus the chances that others would have seen the
bruises and could testify as to their existence are very slight.
The statutes discussed above could be effective tools for deal-
ing with the problem of wife beating. The attitudes of those
charged with the responsibility of enforcing such laws, however, re-
strict their effectiveness and thus largely eliminate criminal reme-
dies as an option for battered women.
Inadequacies of Existing Criminal Remedies
Police Reluctance to Arrest
Police are reluctant to arrest wifebeaters and to get involved
in family disputes for a variety of reasons. 4 Family violence mono-
polizes police time,65 and responding to these calls can be very
dangerous for police officers.66 Additionally, many police officers
believe that family disputes are private matters that should not
involve the police.6 7 The historical attitude that because wives are
the property of their husbands, wife beating should be ignored, 8
also partially accounts for police reluctance to get involved. Fur-
thermore, many police officers feel uncomfortable responding to
wife beating calls because they "do not know how to cope with
them."' Most police officers receive no training in handling do-
nal force."
63. Search, London: Battered Wives, Ms., June 1974, at 24. See also Truninger,
supra note 10, at 264.
64. See generally Parnas, Police Discretion and Diversion of Incidents of Intra-Fam-
ily Violence, 36 LAW & CONTEMP. PRoB. 539, 542-43 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Parnas].
65. See, e.g., Domestic Violence, supra note 3, at 119 (in a six month period in 1970,
Oakland police officers responded to 16,000 family disturbance calls); 1975 Hearings, supra
note 5, at 101 (testimony of Del Martin) (an estimated 60-80% of all calls received by Sacra-
mento police departments involve domestic violence).
66. Thirty percent of all assaults on police officers and 10.7% (10 of 93) of police fatal-
ities in 1978 occurred while responding to disturbance calls, which include family quarrels,
person-with-gun calls, and bar fights. FBI, CIMEs IN THE U.S. 1978, at 301, 307 (1978).
67. Parnas, supra note 64, at 542-43. Professor Parnas contends that "[ailmost all po-
lice officers dislike intervening in family incidents." Id.
68. See text accompanying notes 11-23 supra.
69. BANNON, supra note 10, at 2-3. Professor Bannon postulates that the police are the
worst possible choice of persons to intervene in domestic disputes. "Of all non-athletic occu-
pations none is so absorbed with the use of physical coercive force as that of police. Nor are
any more thoroughly socialized in their masculine role images." Id. at 3.
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mestic violence;10 as a result they are unable to alleviate the tense
situation and fear for their own safety. They often blame the vic-
tim for causing her own beating"1 and consequently seldom arrest
the wifebeater 2
Another reason for police reluctance to arrest wifebeaters is
that police officers know the chances of the cases actually being
prosecuted are very small. 8 Although in some cases the victims
voluntarily drop the charges, reliable evidence indicates that prose-
cutors and police officers encourage the husband and wife to re-
solve the situation outside the criminal justice system.74
Citizens' arrests potentially could be used to circumvent the
limitation on police power to arrest for misdemeanors and the gen-
eral police reluctance to arrest in domestic violence situations. Cit-
izens' arrest statutes typically authorize a private person to arrest
another "[f]or a public offense committed or attempted in his pres-
ence."7 5 Again, however, the attitude of the police eliminates this
potentially effective option for battered women. The police are re-
luctant to tell battered women about their right to make a citizen's
70. Some police officers are now trained in Family Crisis Intervention. See text accom-
panying notes 92-96 infra.
71. During the 1975 California State Hearings on Domestic Violence, the Assistant
Recruit Training Officer for the San Francisco Police Academy observed that victims of
domestic violence are often the "subject of scoldings or accusations" from the police and
that the attitude often taken by the police as well as social service agencies is that the
battered woman has done something to deserve the beatings. 1975 Hearings, supra note 5,
at 50 (testimony of Officer Rackley).
72. James Bannon, Deputy Chief of the Detroit Police Department, "charitably"
terms police attitudes toward battered wives "cavalier" but believes that a more accurate
description would be "misfeasance." BANNON, supra note 10, at 4-5. Clement DeAmicis,
Deputy Chief of Investigations for the San Francisco Police Department, acknowledged that
the feeling of many law enforcement agencies about domestic violence is that it is a trivial
matter. "We have a lot of other more important things to do." 1978 Hearings, supra note 2,
at 111-12.
73. See 1978 Hearings, supra note 2, at 112-13 (testimony of Clement DeAmicis) (of
55 felonies only 12 made it to court, and of the 12 only 3 were tried as felonies). See gener-
ally BANNON, supra note 10, at 5 ("The attrition rate in domestic violence cases is
unbelievable").
74. See BANNON, supra note 10, at 5 ("complainant harassment and prosecutor discre-
tion"); Gingold, supra note 41, at 94 (author states that if the woman does not drop the
charges she is made to feel that she is "vindictively" persisting with something that does not
belong in the court system); Parnas, supra note 64, at 548.
75. CAL. PENAL CODE § 837 (West 1970). Section 837 also authorizes a citizens' arrest
when the person arrested has committed a felony, although not in the private person's pres-
ence, and when a felony has in fact been committed and the individual has reasonable cause
to believe that the person to be arrested has committed the felony. Id.
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arrest 6 and sometimes even prevent the women from making the
arrest when they attempt to do so.7 The citizens' arrest device
thus has been an ineffective alternative to police arrest.
The policy of nonarrest by the police has been characterized
as an abuse of discretion"8 because police consistently decide not to
arrest wifebeaters, in contravention of their duty.79 In response to
this situation, battered women have brought suit within the last
few years to force the police to arrest in wife beating cases. The
women have pursued several theories in support of their claims
that the police have abused their discretion in consistently failing
to arrest wifebeaters.
The first theory, asserted by twelve battered wives against the
New York City Police Department, the Department of Probation,
and the Family Court, 0 alleged that in failing to protect battered
women from assaults by their husbands, the police were violating
their statutory duty to enforce the law.81 The New York Supreme
Court, Special Term, refused to dismiss the suit, stating: "This
Court has the power to compel the Police Department defendants
to perform the duty imposed upon them by law to exercise their
discretion, and to exercise it in a reasonable, nonarbitrary
manner.
,82
Subsequent to this ruling, the New York City Police Depart-
ment entered into a consent decree with the plaintiffs which pro-
vided that the exercise of a police officer's discretion over whether
to arrest a wifebeater would not be affected because: (1) the wo-
man is married to the accused; (2) the woman has not sought or
obtained an Order of Prosecution or Temporary Order of Protec-
76. See MARTin, supra note 6, at 90-92; HANDBOOK, supra note 4, at 5. See generally
Truninger, supra note 10, at 271-73.
77. MARTN, supra note 6, at 90. It is a misdemeanor for "any peace officer who has
the authority to receive or arrest a person charged with a criminal offense" to "willfully"
refuse to arrest the offender. CAL. PENAL CODE § 142 (West 1970).
78. See, e.g., Domestic Violence, supra note 3, at 34-36 (recommending that the police
be required to remain at the scene temporarily to terminate or prevent the commission of
violence, to aid the victim in getting medical care, and to advise the victim of her legal
rights).
79. Not surprisingly, law enforcement agencies strongly resist any proposals to limit
their discretion with regard to when to arrest. See 1978 Hearings, supra note 2, at 110-22
(testimony of Clement DeAmicis, who advocates training but not mandatory arrests); id. at
141-48 (testimony of Neil Strachan).
80. Bruno v. Codd, 47 N.Y.2d 582, 393 N.E.2d 976, 419 N.Y.S.2d 901 (1979).
81. Id. at 585-86, 393 N.E.2d at 977, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 902.
82. 90 Misc. 2d 1047, 1050, 396 N.Y.S.2d 974, 977 (1977).
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tion; (3) the woman has chosen or may choose a particular court; or
(4) the officer believes that it is preferable to reconcile the parties
or mediate, or has attempted or undertaken to reconcile the parties
or mediate, where the woman states her wish to have her husband
arrested. 3 The general effect of the decree was to force police of-
ficers to exercise their discretion in wife beating cases as they do in
other cases and to prohibit officers from considering other factors
relating to their own perceptions of the efficacy of mediation or
referral instead of arrest.
Subsequently, the Appellate Division dismissed the case, hold-
ing that it did not state. a justiciable cause and that a grant of
broad relief would be "such a broad invasion of executive authority
as to risk the danger of unconstitutional encroachment."'" The
New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that a cause of ac-
tion had been stated.85
Lawsuits in Ohio8 6 and California87 have proceeded on a differ-
ent argument. The plaintiffs in those cases alleged that police fail-
ure to arrest husbands for beating their wives was a denial of equal
protection.88 They urged that no rational basis exists for refusing
to arrest a person who commits an assault simply because that per-
son happens to be married to or cohabiting with the victim. 9 The
state interests in preserving the family and protecting marital pri-
vacy were urged not to be rationally related to the nonarrest pos-
ture because arrest avoidance often leads to the disastrous conse-
quence of spouse killing. Whether the equal protection argument
will be successful is still an open question; however,90 the ultimate
issue was not reached in any of the cases because consent decrees
83. See [1978] 23 CRIM. L. REP. (BNA) 2338 (consent decree of June 26, 1978).
84. 64 A.D.2d 582, 583, 407 N.Y.S.2d 165, 167 (1978).
85. 47 N.Y.2d 582, 393 N.E.2d 976, 419 N.Y.S.2d 901 (1979). Nevertheless, the court
affirmed the denial of relief based on the fact that the consent decree already in effect pro-
vided most of the relief requested by the plaintiffs. Id. at 589-92, 393 N.E.2d at 979-81, 419
N.Y.S.2d at 905-07.
86. Raguz v. Chandler, No. 74-1064 (N.D. Ohio, filed Feb. 4, 1975).
87. Scott v. Hart, No. 76-2395 (N.D. Cal., filed Nov. 24, 1976).
88. Remedies For Abused Women, supra note 2, at 168. The Cleveland suit also raised
due process and first amendment issues. See Raguz v. Chandler, No. 74-1064 (N.D. Ohio,
filed Feb. 4, 1975).
89. This argument is discussed more fully in Remedies For Abused Women, supra
note 2, at 168-71.
90. At least one author is skeptical of the chances of success of the equal protection
argument. See id. at 171-72.
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were adopted by the parties.9'
Family Crisis Intervention Training
Some effort is being made to adapt police procedures to the
problems of wife beating. Until the late 1960's most police officers
received no training in the handling of family disputes. Since that
time, family crisis intervention (FCI) training has become quite
popular throughout the country.9 2 The philosophy underlying the
FCI approach is "problem solving," with an emphasis on referral
rather than on arrest and prosecution. 3 The goal is to achieve
"lasting solutions" to the problems so as to avoid the need for "re-
peated police involvement."'"
Although the FCI approach is to be commended in that it
teaches officers how to diffuse a tense situation rather than exacer-
bating it as they have often done in the past, it does not go far
91. In Scott v. Hart, No. 76-2395 (N.D. Cal., filed Nov. 24, 1976), a consent decree that
effected a "massive change in policy of the Oakland Police Department" was agreed to by
the police. 1978 Hearings, supra note 2, at 88 (testimony of Eva Patterson, Attorney, San
Francisco Lawyers Comm. for Urban Affairs). In Raguz v. Chandler, No. 74-1064 (N.D.
Ohio, filed Feb. 4, 1975), the prosecutor agreed to a consent decree. Remedies For Abused
Women, supra note 2, at 167.
92. For a comprehensive discussion of FCI programs, see generally Parnas, supra note
67, at 548-58. FCI programs are based on a model developed by Dr. Morton Bard, who
acknowledges that the techniques were designed in order to protect the safety of police
officers. See MARTN, supra note 6, at 135. See generally Roy, supra note 6, at 172-92.
The following is an example of one FCI program. In January 1971, the Oakland Police
Department instituted an experimental unit to deal with family disturbances. The unit was
composed of two patrol cars of two persons each. 1975 Hearings, supra note 5, at 211-12.
The FCI training given to the officers involved a one-day seminar with representatives from
social service agencies. Parnas, supra note 67, at 557. The officers in the program were in-
structed to "sell" the referral and to arrest only as a last resort. 1975 Hearings, supra note
5, at 216. A syllabus of the Oakland program explains: "Frequently, when the attempt at
problem-solving breaks down, one of the disputants asks, out of frustration, to have the
other arrested. It is important to understand that an arrest in these instances does not
usually contribute to solving the disputes .... Therefore, the FCIU has tried to prevent
such unnecessary arrests and to channel the disputants back into constructive problem-solv-
ing discussion." Id. Although the report on the Oakland program concludes that a prelimi-
nary evaluation of the program showed it to be 82% successful, no concrete definition of
"success" is offered. Id. at 217. Presumably, success refers to the couple's utilization of re-
ferral agencies or decision not to call the police in the future. This "success" rate is only
encouraging if it is assumed that curtailing police involvement in wife beating cases is a
solution to the problem. Surely, it helps the police by freeing them to deal with other
problems that may be less threatening to their safety. But, this is certainly not success from
the point of view of the battered wife in need of protection.
93. Parnas, supra note 64, at 556.
94. 1975 Hearings, supra note 5, at 212.
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enough. Temporary solutions are insufficient for long-term
problems. The tense situation is quieted for the moment, but noth-
ing is done to prevent its recurrence. Although referrals are made,
little followup is done to see if the family is utilizing them.95 An
additional problem with the FCI approach is that it seeks to treat
criminal behavior as noncriminal."8 Unless wife beating is recog-
nized as criminal conduct, with the social and legal stigma that
such conduct entails, marital privacy and property concepts will
continue to encourage wife beating. Perhaps in the rare case, in-
volving an isolated incident of wife beating with no resulting inju-
ries, prosecution may not be warranted, but it is irrational to as-
sume that a victim of a violent assault does not want to prosecute.
In fact, it seems much more reasonable to assume that, if the vic-
tim called the police, she wants her husband arrested.
The Failure of District Attorneys to Prosecute
Even if the battered wife succeeds in getting her husband ar-
rested, her problems are far from over. As discussed above, the at-
trition rate in family violence cases is alarmingly high. Moreover,
domestic violence cases are routinely given a low priority by prose-
cutors.98 District attorneys are burdened with heavy caseloads,
which present the temptation not to prosecute difficult cases."
They also may feel that prosecution is not warranted because do-
mestic violence cases are of minor importance and should not be
dealt with in the criminal justice system.100 Again, the attitudes of
95. See Parnas, supra note 64, at 556 (in the first 12 weeks of the program only 26 of
72 referrals completed their appointments).
96. One police official believes that crisis intervention may have been misguided in
this regard. He speaks of the new philosophy of the San Francisco Police Department- "We
have absolutely no argument that people who are abusers should be put in jail." 1978 Hear-
ings, supra note 2, at 113 (testimony of Clement DeAmicis). "[I]f it is a repeated situation
where the person knowingly and wantonly beats another person in the domestic scene...
he should. . .'be cited [and] put in jail." Id. at 114.
97. See note 73 & accompanying text supra. San Francisco statistics for the first six
months of 1978 illustrate the magnitude of the problem. In that time, 230 police reports
involving family violence were filed, yet only 12 of these cases survived long enough to go to
court and only seven guilty findings were made, four of which were on reduced misdemeanor
charges. 1978 Hearings, supra note 2, at 113 (testimony of Clement DeAmicis).
98. 1978 Hearings, supra note 2, at 48 (testimony of Burt Pines).
99. MARTIn, supra note 6, at 109.
100. See, e.g., Eisenberg & Micklow, supra note 9, at 158; Parnas, Prosecutorial and
Judicial Handling of Family Violence, 9 CRis. L. BuLL. 733, 733-35; Remedies For Abused
Women, supra note 2, at 149-50.
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prosecutors may be influenced by historical concepts of wives as
their husbands' property.101 For all these reasons, district attorneys
dislike handling domestic violence cases and try to discourage vic-
tims from following through with their complaints.
The victim nearly always bears the burden of going forward
with the case. District attorneys, as well as the police and the bat-
tering husband, frequently pressure the victim into dropping the
charges.0 2 The battered wife is made to feel that she will bear the
responsibility for the assailant's possible incarceration and loss of
employment if she pursues the case.103 With this heavy psychologi-
cal burden, it is not at all surprising that many battered women
refuse to prosecute.""
In view of the foregoing factors, the chances are extremely
small that the battered wife will be able to overcome the reluc-
tance of both the police and the district attorney to treat wife
beating as a criminal offense. Even in the rare case where the
wifebeater does get convicted, the victim may wonder whether it
was worth the effort because her abusive husband is likely to be
given no more than a light punishment.10 5
Other Remedies
Temporary Restraining Orders
Temporary restraining orders (TRO's) are the most common
101. See text accompanying notes 11-23 supra.
102. See BANNON, supra note 10, at 5. See generally 1978 Hearings, supra note 2, at
52 (testimony of Burt Pines); HANDBOOK, supra note 4, at 10; Eisenberg & Micklow, supra
note 9, at 149.
103. See 1978 Hearings, supra note 2, at 50 (testimony of Burt Pines); Gingold, supra
note 41, at 94.
104. See HANDBOOK, supra note 4, at 10; Parnas, Judicial Response to Intra-Family
Violence, 54 MINN. L. Rav. 585, 594 (1970); Truninger, supra note 10, at 273. But see MAR-
TiN, supra note 6, at 94 (quoting Carol Murray, former director of San Francisco Neighbor-
hood Legal Assistance Foundation, Domestic Relations Unit, as stating that she has never
seen any statistics indicating that domestic violence victims drop charges more frequently
than victims of other crimes. She suggests that the problem really is that there is just a
single witness).
105. Few wifebeaters are ever sent to jail. See Parnas, Prosecutorial and Judicial
Handling of Family Violence, 9 CRiM. L. BuLL. 733, 747-50 (1973). Rather, most wifebeaters
get off with a warning or probation. See generally HANDBOOK, supra note 4, at 114-18 (flow
chart of the entire process); Eisenberg & Micklow, supra note 9, at 159; Remedies For
Abused Women, supra note 2, at 15-52.
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way that the legal system deals with domestic violence.10 Although
TRO's are frequently used, traditionally they have been ineffective
in protecting the battered wife. Police officers have almost univer-
sally refused to arrest offenders for violations of these orders10
even though the violation of a TRO is technically a misde-
meanor. 0 Most TRO's do not clearly specify the type of conduct
that is prohibited,109 and police officers generally do not have the
training necessary to decipher legal terminology. 110 Even if the po-
lice did feel that the enforcement of TRO's in domestic violence
cases was within their duties, they would still have a difficult time
determining if the order had been violated. Lack of uniformity in
the wording of the orders further exacerbates this problem. Fi-
nally, because the violation of a TRO is only a misdemeanor, the
officers must actually witness the prohibited behavior before they
may arrest."''
The complex procedure necessary to obtain an enforceable
TRO also may discourage many battered women from seeking this
type of legal protection.1 2 The process typically requires a woman
to retain an attorney, fill out a petition explaining why the order is
necessary, file it with the court, get the order personally served on
her husband by a specified time before the show cause hearing,
and finally, testify at the hearing."' As a consequence, obtaining a
TRO is expensive unless the woman qualifies for legal aid or can
106. See, e.g., 1978 Hearings, supra note 2, at 62 (the domestic violence unit of Santa
Clara County Legal Services obtains TRO's in 90% of its active cases).
107. See 1978 Hearings, supra note 2, at 98, 139; MARTIN, supra note 6, at 105; Eisen-
berg & Micklow, supra note 9, at 154; Truninger, supra note 10, at 274.
108. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 273.6 (West Supp. 1980).
109. 1978 Hearings, supra note 2, at 73, 140. See also MARTIN, supra note 6, at 107.
110. 1978 Hearings, supra note 2, at 138.
111. See text accompanying notes 56-57 supra.
112. A legal aid attorney related the experience of one of his clients attempting to
enforce a TRO: "She called the police to seek assistance in enforcing this Restraining Order
that she'd received. And the police officer's response was that this Restraining Order needs
to be on file with our department before he will enforce it. The woman went to get the order
on file and was told by the people at the department that she needed certified copies of the
order before they would receive it for filing. She went back to the court and got her certified
copies, and then when she went back to the police department was told that she would need
proof of personal service of the orders before they would receive them for filing. After she
got the proof of personal service of the orders and went back to the police department, the
following time she was then told that these orders were not orders that had been issued
under the new 527(b) and, therefore, could not be filed." 1978 Hearings, supra note 2, at 63-
64.
113. See MARTIN, supra note 6, at 105; Truninger, supra note 10, at 267-68.
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file in forma pauperis.11'
The California Legislature enacted the Domestic Violence Pre-
vention Act, which became effective July 1, 1980, in an effort to
address the problem of wife battering in a more comprehensive
and effective fashion.1 5 Although the Act retains the usual cum-
bersome procedure for securing a TRO,116 it also contains unusual
provisions that potentially could make TRO's more effective reme-
dies for battered women. First, TRO's under the Act remain in ef-
fect for ninety days 17 with the possibility of extensions up to one
year.11 Furthermore, the Act requires that the TRO state the expi-
ration date and contain the following statement: "NOTICE: These
orders shall be enforced by all law enforcement officers in the State
of California." 1 " Transmittal of a copy of the TRO to local law
enforcement agencies is required by the Domestic Violence Pre-
vention Act.1 0
Under the Act, California courts also are empowered to make
114. Truninger, supra note 10, at 267. See also MARTIN, supra note 6, at 105.
115. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE §§ 540-543 (West Supp. 1980). The statute sets forth the
following statement of purpose: "The purposes of this chapter are to prevent the recurrence
of acts of violence by a spouse or household member against another spouse or other family
or household members and to provide for a separation of the persons involved in such do-
mestic violence for a period of time sufficient to enable such persons to seek resolution of
the causes of the violence." Id. § 540. For TRO wife beating statutes in other states, see ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 69, § 25 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1980); OHno REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.26 (Page
Supp. 1979); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, §§ 10181-10190 (Purdon 1977).
116. The procedure is as follows: Any family or household member who was actually
residing with the person at whom the order is directed can get a TRO without notice, upon
a showing that irreparable harm would otherwise result and that the person to whom the
order will be directed cannot be located or for some reason should not be given notice. If the
TRO is granted without notice, a show cause hearing must be held within 15 days. CAL. Civ.
PROC. CODE §§ 527, 545, 546 (West Supp. 1980). The TRO can consist of an order: "(2)
enjoining any party from contacting, molesting, attacking, striking, threatening, sexually as-
saulting, battering, or disturbing the peace of the other party, and, in the discretion of the
court, upon a showing of good cause, other named family and household members" or "(6)
enjoining a party from specified behavior which the court determines is necessary to effectu-
ate orders under paragraph (2). . .." CAL. CiV. CODE § 4359(a) (West Supp. 1980). Viola-
tion of a TRO is a misdemeanor. Id. § 4359(c).
117. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 548 (West Supp. 1980). A 1979 amendment to § 527(b)
extended the duration of all other TROs from 30 to 90 days.
118. Id. § 548. The one year maximum extension period explicitly applies only to ex-
tensions by "mutual consent of the parties." This leaves open the possibility that on motion
of a party the court could extend the TRO beyond the one year period. Id.
119. Id. § 552.
120. Id. § 550. The law enforcement agencies are required to make information on the
status of TRO's available to "any law enforcement officer responding to the scene of re-
ported domestic violence." Id.
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the following types of orders:121 (1) an order that restitution be
paid for losses incurred as a direct result of physical abuse or for
losses incurred as a result of an ex parte TRO later found to be
unsupported by sufficient facts,122 (2) an order requiring counseling
where the parties so stipulate, 2 ' and (3) an order directing the
payment of attorneys' fees and costs to the prevailing party.12 4 Fi-
nally, the court has the discretionary power to appoint counsel for
the plaintiff in TRO enforcement proceedings. 126
Diversion Programs
The difficulties encountered by battered women in getting
their husbands prosecuted are further exacerbated by mandatory
diversion programs. To deal with the overwhelming number of do-
mestic violence cases, district attorneys and judges have set up
special diversion departments. 2 ' This method of resolution typi-
cally involves "admonishing violators of the Penal Code to keep
peace" and possibly a counseling referral, although referrals are
not mandatory. 2 7 The usual outcome is as follows: "In most cases
the complaint hearing resolves the matter to the satisfaction of all
concerned persons. The need for filing formal criminal charges is
usually avoided, saving time and expense of lawyers and courts.' 28
121. These orders can only be issued with notice and a hearing. Id. § 547.
122. Id. § 547(c). Restitution for losses resulting from physical abuse includes compen-
sation for loss of earnings and out-of-pocket expenses including, but not limited to, expenses
for medical care and temporary housing. Restitution to a party injured by an unfounded
TRO is limited to out-of-pocket expenses. Id.
123. Id. § 547(d).
124. Id. § 547(e).
125. Id. § 553(a). If the court does appoint counsel, the court may order the defendant
to pay the plaintiff's attorneys' fees and costs. Id.
126. For example, the San Francisco Family Bureau is staffed by four investigators
who perform crisis intervention work and hold citation hearings, as well as handle criminal
complaints arising out of family situations. 1975 Hearings, supra note 5, at 72-74; Parnas,
Prosecutorial and Judicial Handling of Family Violence, 9 CRIM. L. BULL. 733, 737 (1973).
The Bureau initially sends a complaint notice to the accused and then conducts an informal
hearing at which the victim confronts the defendant and discusses the situation. Parnas,
Prosecutorial and Judicial Handling of Family Violence, 9 CRIM. L. BULL. 733, 737 (1973).
The investigator is simply a fact finder and does not usually counsel the parties. 1975 Hear-
ings, supra note 5, at 75.
127. 1975 Hearings, supra note 5, at 75.
128. Id. at 219. Prosecutors have been very successful in keeping these cases out of the
court system. See 1978 Hearings, supra note 2, at 48 (in Los Angeles County, four times as
many cases went through the office hearing system than the number of cases that proceeded
to prosecution); MARTIN, supra note 6, at 110 (in 1973-74, only eight out of several thousand
cases handled by the San Francisco Family Bureau led to prosecution).
It should be recognized, however, that the goal in wife beating
cases should be to prevent future beatings and not solely to
achieve judicial economy.
Although it is sometimes possible to bypass these special de-
partments,2 e it still remains difficult to have wifebeaters prose-
cuted. District attorneys believe that stringent proof must exist
before seeking a warrant is justified. Two witnesses, a police re-
port, and a history of previous attacks are considered the "funda-
mentals."130 These fundamentals are difficult to fulfill because usu-
ally there are no witnesses and often the police do not file reports;
hence previous attacks frequently are not documented.
Another type of diversionary prbgram is the Conciliation
Court, which is a special branch of a county court set up to help
spouses handle domestic problems." 1 Although this diversionary
program may be helpful for some battered women and their
spouses, it is based on the assumption that domestic violence is not
a criminal activity to be adjudicated in the courts, but rather a
social problem that can be solved by discussion and referrals. Con-
ciliation hearings can be "cruel hoaxes ' 13 2 because they divert the
victims from pursuing criminal litigation and thus ignore the fu-
ture safety of the woman. The informal hearing system also lacks
the capacity for followup on referrals and for enforced counseling,
because of the court's inadequate staffing and financing.13 s
Some prosecutors, however, are starting to acknowledge that
wife abuse is a crime and should be treated as one. 3 An important
129. For example, after San Francisco District Attorney Freitas took office in 1976, he
yielded to pressure from feminists and set up a procedure whereby it is now possible for a
battered woman to bypass the Family Bureau and proceed directly to prosecution. If the
charge is a felony, it is assigned to the assault team, and if it is a misdemeanor, the general
works division prosecutes the case. MARTIN, supra note 6, at 111.
130. Id. at 109-10.
131. HANDBOOK, supra note 4, at 11. Conciliation courts existed in the following coun-
ties in California, as of 1978: Alameda, Fresno, Imperial, Los Angeles, Sacramento, Naps,
San Bernadino, San Diego, San Joaquin, San Mateo, Santa Clara, Sonoma, and Contra
Costa. Id. A fairly innovative program of this type has been established in San Diego by
Judge Ehrenfreund. In his court, the battered woman can come in and make a statement,
and a few hours later the judge may issue a TRO. No filing fee or attorney is required. 1978
Hearings, supra note 2, at 72.
132. MARTIN, supra note 6, at 113.
133. 1978 Hearings, supra note 2, at 126.
134. The Los Angeles City Attorney's Office has set up a domestic violence program
with the understanding that "crimes of violence which occur between persons in a personal
relationship are no less criminal than those involving strangers." Id. at 49. The established
guidelines require that each case be evaluated by an attorney who must decide whether an
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philosophical change is reflected in the attitude that domestic vio-
lence, like any other criminal activity, is an offense against the
state. This attitude leads to the conclusion that it is the prosecu-
tion, not the victim, that bears the responsibility for litigating the
case. 135 Prosecutors who have accepted their responsibility in this
area have found that formerly reluctant victims can become effec-
tive witnesses and that convictions can be attained.36
Thus, diversionary programs, if used in combination with rig-
orous prosecution, can be an effective way to treat domestic vio-
lence. Unfortunately, the usual practice is an automatic diversion
out of the criminal justice system, a practice that is based on the
erroneous assumption that wife beating cases are not appropriate
for criminal treatment.
Shelters and Victim-Witness Assistance Programs
One option increasingly available to battered women is the
temporary use of a shelter.187 Shelters generally provide a range of
services in addition to a place to stay, such as assertiveness train-
ing, child care, and legal assistance. 88 All of these services can aid
office hearing or a criminal complaint would be appropriate. The prosecutor, at least theo-
retically, evaluates the evidence as he or she would in a nondomestic violence case, and the
investigating agency is expected to do a thorough job. Id.
135. See 1978 Hearings, supra note 2, at 50, 127.
136. Burt Pines, Los Angeles City Attorney, found that "once we have explained that
it is our decision, that the woman doesn't have to feel guilty about pressing the charges;
many are willing to go forward." 1978 Hearings, supra note 2, at 51. Alameda County Dep-
uty District Attorney, Carol Corrigan, similarly found that "with proper support and coun-
seling a reluctant witness will be able to gather the wherewithal to go into court and be an
effective witness for the prosecution." Id. at 127.
137. The idea of establishing places where women could stay temporarily with their
children was fostered by Erin Pizzey, founder of Chiswick Women's Aid in England. MAR-
UN, supra note 6, at 225. This refuge, which opened in 1971, is still unique in that not only
does it provide temporary housing facilities, but "second stage" homes for more than 500
women and children have been set up to furnish longer-term housing. Search, Scream Qui-
etly, Ms., Aug. 1976, at 96. Women's Aid also offers special schooling for the children and
training for the teenagers of these violent homes. Money for the "very special education"
needed by these children was contributed by an anonymous donor. Id.
Three states have established special funding programs for shelters. See CAL. WELl. &
INST. CODE §§ 18290-18303 (West Supp. 1979) (repealed 1980); MxcH. Comp. LAWS ANN. §§
400.1501-1511 (West Supp. 1980); WASH. RPV. CODE ANN. §§ 70.123.010-900 (West Supp.
1980).
138. Anderson, When They Can Stand No More .... San Francisco Sunday Exam-
iner/Chronicle California Living Magazine, Oct. 10, 1976, at 9-10 (referring to La Casa in
San Francisco). There are. now over 70 refuges for battered women in the country. For a
national list of shelters, see T. DAvmsoN, CONJUGAL CrmE 237-52 (1978).
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the battered woman who needs emotional support as well as prac-
tical advice.
Victim-Witness Assistance Programs can also provide practi-
cal help for battered women. The goal of these programs is to help
Victims of violent crime negotiate the criminal justice system suc-
cessfully by explaining court procedures to them.18 Additionally,
the victim is furnished with transportation to court, aid in apply-
ing for state victim compensation benefits,140 child care, and refer-
rals to community social services.1 41 Such projects are administered
by a variety of sources, including district attorneys' offices, courts,
police departments, and local bar associations. 142
Although refuges and victim assistance programs provide some
temporary relief for some battered women, they are incomplete so-
lutions1 43 because they do nothing to ensure the future safety of
the victim or to punish the offender.
Fighting Back in Self-Defense
Self-Defense Requirements
The inadequacy of the remedies discussed above to solve the
problems of battered women must be considered as integral to a
woman's perception of the danger inherent in her situation. In
other words, the battered wife's perception of her situation is influ-
enced by the historical acceptance of wife beating, her emotional
and economic dependency on her husband, and the inadequate re-
sponse of the criminal justice system to the problem.
Attorneys have recently attempted to assert justifiable homi-
139. 1978 Hearings, supra note 2, at 127. The programs are designed mainly to help
rape and domestic violence victims. See also HANDBOOK, supra note 4, at 58.
140. CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 13959-13969.1 (West Supp. 1979) established the Victims of
Crime Act. These sections provide for a maximum of $10,000 for medical expenses, $10,000
maximum for lost wages, and $3,000 maximum for job retraining. Id. § 13965. The money is
not available to victims who fail "to cooperate with a law enforcement agency in the appre-
hension and conviction of the criminal committing the crime," and the award may be denied
because of the "nature of [the victim's] involvement in the events leading to the crime." Id.
§ 13964. These two provisions would probably exclude most battered women from recover-
ing under the Act.
141. HANDBOOK, supra note 4, at 57-62.
142. Id. The Handbook also includes a list of the California counties that have
adopted such programs. Id. at 57-60.
143. "[I]t's like putting a Band-Aid on a cancer." Search, London: Battered Wives,
Ms., June 1974, at 26.
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cide'" to exculpate women who fight back in self-defense. 45 In-
sanity146 and diminished capacity147 are also possible pleas for the
battered wife but are not entirely appropriate in this context be-
cause the woman's mental capacity to entertain the requisite in-
tent is not impaired. Rather, because of the circumstances, the
battered wife rationally concludes that she must defend herself or
she will be killed by her husband.
The traditional prerequisites of self-defense 148 are: (1) the de-
fendant used a reasonable amount of force, and (2) the defendant
reasonably believed that she or he was in immediate danger and
144. Other women have pleaded insanity or have been given reduced manslaughter
charges. See generally E. SCHNEIDR & S. JORDAN, REPRESENTATION OF WOMEN WHO DEFEND
THEMSELvES IN RESPONSE TO PHYSICAL OR SEXUAL ASSAULT 21-24 (1978), reprinted in 4 Wo-
MEN'S RTs. L. REP. 149 (1978) [hereinafter cited as SCHNEIDER & JORDAN]; Potential De-
fense, supra note 2, at 223-26.
145. Reports of the success rates of the self-defense plea vary. See, e.g., Levine, Bat-
tered Lives, The Continuing Trials of Bernadette Powell, The Village Voice, Dec. 24, 1979,
at 29 (quotes Dr. Lenore Walker, an expert witness in these cases, as saying that "there is a
new standard of justice for self-defense being offered."); Lewin, Self-Defense For Battered
Women-When Victims Kill, The National Law Journal, Oct. 29, 1979, at 11 (quotes Pro-
fessor Schnieder: "[W]e've already seen a lot of acquittals on self-defense."); Scheier, Did
Pat Evans Kill Her Husband in Self-Defense?, CHICAGO LAW., Oct. 1979, at 3 (stating that
the self-defense plea seems to be largely unsuccessful and pointing to the results of a survey
of attorneys who have used the plea; most say that their clients were convicted). See gener-
ally SCHNEIDER & JORDAN, supra note 147, at 4 n.3 (contains a list of cases in which battered
women committed homicide and the dispositions of those cases).
146. For a discussion of insanity as a defense in a criminal trial, see generally W.
LAFAVE & A. Scor, HANDBOOK ON CRnMNAL LAW § 36, at 268 (1972). There are basically
two tests for insanity. The first test was formulated in M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718,
722 (1843): "[T]o establish a defense on the ground of insanity, it must be clearly proved
that, at the time of the committing of the act, the party accused was laboring under such a
defect of reason, from a disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the
act he was doing; or, if he did know it, that he did not know he was doing what was wrong."
The second is the Model Penal Code formulation: "A person is not responsible for criminal
conduct if at the time of such conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks sub-
stantial capacity either to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his con-
duct to the requirements of the law." MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(1) (1962). The Model Penal
Code test was specifically adopted in United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir.
1972).
147. See generally 30 VAND. L. Rv. 213 (1977) (discussion of diminished capacity in
California). See also B. WrrKIN & J. LEAvrrr, 1 CALIFORNIA CRIMES § 147A at 127-35 (Supp.
1978). The following definition of diminished capacity is given: In certain circumstances
"[m]ental illness not amounting to legal insanity may negative the existence of a particular
mental state which is an element of the crime charged." Id. at 127.
148. In some states the person attacked is required to retreat if he or she can do so
safely before resorting to deadly force. See generally Note, Limits on the Use of Defensive
Force to Prevent Intramarital Assaults, 10 RuT-C ,s. L.J. 643, 653-57 (1979).
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 32
BATTERED WIVES
that the force used was necessary to avoid the danger. 149 Moreover,
deadly force can be used only if the person reasonably believes
that the other is about to inflict unlawful death or serious bodily
harm.150 There is a split of authority as to whether the defendant's
belief as to the need to use deadly force and the immediacy of the
danger is evaluated by an objective or subjective standard. 51 Re-
gardless of which standard a particular state follows, all of the
aforementioned circumstances should be considered when deter-
mining whether the battered wife acted in self-defense. Under the
subjective standard, these circumstances are relevant to the wo-
man's own belief in the necessity of using self-defense. Under the
objective standard, on the other hand, the jury must consider these
149. See W. LAFAvE & A. SCOTT, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW § 53, at 391 (1972). See
also R. PERKS, CRMINAL LAW 993-1018 (2d ed. 1969); MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04 (Tent.
Draft No. 8, 1958).
150. W. LAFAvz & A. ScoTT, HANDBOOK ON CZiMImAL LAW § 53, at 391 (1972); MODEL
PENAL CODE § 3.04(2)(b), (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1958).
151. W. LAFiva & A. ScoTT, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW § 53, at 391 (1972) states
the objective standard: "One who is not the aggressor in an encounter is justified in using a
reasonable amount of force against his adversary when he reasonably believes (a) that he is
in immediate danger of unlawful bodily harm from his adversary and (b) that the use of
such force is necessary to avoid this danger." R. PERKINs, CRIMINAL LAW 993-94 (2d ed.
1969) criticizes the subjective standard: "At the other extreme is an occasional holding to
the effect that if the other requirements are satisfied, the defender will be excused if he
acted from an honest belief in the greatness and imminence of his peril. This was too broad
a position and hence the limitation was added that his belief must be based upon reasonable
grounds. The reasonable belief of the defender under the circumstances as they appear at
the moment is both necessary and sufficient for this aspect of the privilege of self-defense.
The question is not whether the jury believes the force used was necessary in self-defense,
but whether the defendant, acting as a reasonable man had this belief." 40 AM. Jun. 2d
Homicide § 154 (1968) states that the subjective standard is the minority position: "The
rule adopted in a few states, and what seems to have been the common-law rule, is that
when a person is assaulted and kills his assailant in self-defense, the question to be deter-
mined is whether the slayer, under all the circumstances as they appeared to him, honestly
believed that he was in imminent danger of losing his life, or of suffering great bodily harm,
and that it was necessary to do what he did in order to save himself from such apparent
threatened danger, and it is not whether a reasonable man, or a man of reasonable courage,
would have so believed. The rule followed by most of the courts is that the apprehension of
danger and belief of necessity which will justify killing in self-defense must be a reasonable
apprehension and belief, such as a reasonable man would, under the circumstances, have
entertained." The Model Penal Cede adopts the subjective standard: "[T]he use of force
upon or toward another person is justifiable when the actor believes that such force is imme-
diately necessary for the purpose of protecting himself against the use of unlawful force by
such other person on the present occasion." MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(1) (Tent. Draft No.
8, 1958). The Comments explain: "The formulation thus requires that the actor believe that
the circumstances create the necessity for using some protective force and that the force
that he employs does not exqeed what he believes to be essential to relieve his peril." Id. §
3.04, Comment 1.
March 1981]
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
circumstances in order to determine if the woman's belief in the
necessity of using self-defense was reasonable.
In applying the elements of self defense to a situation in which
a battered wife kills her husband, the problems that most often
arise are whether the woman reasonably believed that deadly force
was necessary and whether she reasonably believed that she was in
immediate danger. The historical acceptance of wife beating, the
wife's economic and emotional dependency, and the inadequate re-
sponse of the criminal justice system to wife beating are all crucial
elements of the battered wife's perception of her need to use self-
defense.
The Woman's Perception of the Danger
All the Surrounding Circumstances Must be Considered
The success of the self-defense plea in battered women cases
depends on presenting the battered wife's overall perception of the
situation to the jury.152 Because few self-defense cases involving
battered women or closely analogous situations have reached the
appellate court level, there is very little case law on the subject.
The leading case in this developing area of the law is State v.
Wanrow,15 3 a 1977 plurality decision of the Washington Supreme
Court. Yvonne Wanrow was not a battered woman but her percep-
tion of danger was similar to that experienced by a battered wo-
man, as will be discussed in detail later. The Washington court re-
versed Ms. Wanrow's conviction for second-degree murder and
first-degree assault, in part because of error by the court with re-
gard to self-defense jury instructions.15'
According to the court, a misstatement of law was contained
in jury instruction 10, which read in part:
To justify killing in self-defense, there need be no actual or real
danger to the life or person of the party killing, but there must
be, or reasonably appear to be, at or immediately before the kill-
ing, some overt act, or some circumstances which would reasona-
bly indicate to the party killing that the person slain, is, at the
time, endeavoring to kill him or inflict upon him great bodily
152. See generally SCHNEIDER & JoRAN, supra note 144, at 11-21.
153. 88 Wash. 2d 221, 559 P.2d 548 (1977).
154. Id. at 224, 559 P.2d at 550. The other ground for reversal involved the admission
of a tape recording into evidence. Id. at 226-33, 559 P.2d at 551-55.
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harm. 155
The Washington Supreme Court focused on the phrase "at or im-
mediately before the killing," stating that it impermissibly nar-
rowed the scope of the jury's inquiry into the surrounding circum-
stances: "It is clear that the jury is entitled to consider all of the
circumstances surrounding the incident in determining whether
[the] defendant had reasonable grounds to believe grievous bodily
harm was about to be inflicted." 156
In Wanrow, "all of the circumstances surrounding the inci-
dent" included Ms. Wanrow's knowledge that Wesler, whom she
had killed, was a child molester, had once been committed to a
mental hospital, and had recently pulled her son off his bicycle and
dragged him into a house. Wanrow also knew that the daughter of
a friend had identified Wesler as having sexually molested her.1
57
The fact situation in Wanrow is very similar to that present in'
the wife battering situation. In both cases the women are inti-
mately familiar with the man's past history of violent attacks.
These attacks represent a continuous course of conduct over time
and serve to keep the woman constantly on-guard. In Wanrow, as
in most wife battering cases, the police had been called previous to
the attack in question but had declined to do anything to resolve
the situation. The size difference between the woman attempting
to defend herself and her attacker is another common element. Ms.
Wanrow was 5'4" and using a crutch, whereas Wesler was 6'2".
Often battered women are reticent to leave the dangerous situation
because they fear for the safety of their children, as did Ms.
155. Id. at 234 n.7, 559 P.2d at 555.
156. Id. at 236, 559 P.2d at 556 (quoting State v. Lewis, 6 Wash. App. 38, 41, 491 P.2d
1062, 1064 (1971)). The Wanrow court held that Instruction 12, which advised the jury to
"consider the words and actions of the deceased prior to the homicide. . . together with
any and all factors which in your judgment may bear upon [self-defense]", did not cure the
defect. 88 Wash. 2d at 238, 559 P.2d at 557.
157. 88 Wash. 2d at 224-25, 559 P.2d at 550-51. In addition, the following information
about Wesler had been related to Ms. Wanrow by her friend Ms. Hooper: (1) Wanrow's son
had told Hooper that a man had tried to pull him off his bicycle and drag him into a house.
A few minutes after the child related this to Hooper, Wesler appeared on her porch claiming
that he "didn't touch the kid." (2) At the same time, Hooper's daughter, who had been
molested and contracted veneral disease several months previously, identified Wesler as her
assailant. (3) According to Hooper's landlord, Wesler tried to molest a young boy who had
lived in the house Hooper now occupied, and Wesler had been committed to Eastern State
Hospital for the mentally ill. (4) Hooper had called the police and asked them to arrest
Wesler, but they said that they could not arrest him until Monday morning. (5) A week
earlier, Hooper had noticed a prowler around her house and two days before that someone
had slashed the window screen. Hooper suspected Wesler of being the prowler. Id.
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Wanrow whose children were present when the deadly confronta-
tion took place. Finally, the wifebeater is often intoxicated, just as
Wesler was in this case. Because of the similarity of the fact situa-
tions, the legal reasoning can be analogized as well.
The Wanrow court's statement that the "jury is entitled to
consider all of the circumstances surrounding the incident in de-
termining whether [the] defendant had reasonable grounds to be-
lieve grievous bodily harm was about to be inflicted" 158 seems to
apply to the requirement that the woman who claims self-defense
believe that she was in immediate danger. But, somewhat later in
the opinion, the court emphasizes the "crucial importance" of the
jury's consideration of Wanrow's knowledge of Wesler's reputation
for violence. This information would be useful to the jury in deter-
mining the "degree of force which. . . a reasonable person in the
same situation ... seeing what [s]he sees and knowing what [s]he
knows, then would believe to be necessary."159 This statement of
the court seems to apply to the self-defense requirement that only
a reasonable amount of force be used. The conclusion that can be
drawn is that a consideration of all of the circumstances surround-
ing the incident relates to the perception of both the immediacy of
the danger and the reasonableness of the amount of force used.
The Wanrow court's standard reflects the general rule that the
jury is entitled to consider the reputation of the attacker, including
incidents of past beatings, when the defendant claims to have
acted in self-defense.160 The rule has been stated as follows:
[A]fter laying the proper evidentiary foundation, [the defendant]
may introduce evidence of the turbulent and dangerous character
of the deceased ... to show that the circumstances were such as
would have naturally caused a man of ordinary prudence to be-
lieve that he was, at the time of the killing, in imminent danger of
losing his life or of suffering great bodily harm.11
People v. Bush,1 62 a case involving a battered woman pleading
self-defense to the murder of her husband, held even more explic-
itly than Wanrow that prior threats and beatings must be consid-
158. Id. at 236, 559 P.2d at 556.
159. Id. at 237-38, 559 P.2d at 557 (quoting State v. Dunning, 8 Wash. App. 340, 342,
506 P.2d 321, 322 (1973)).
160. See, e.g., 40 Am. JuR. 2d Homicide §§ 303-309 (1968) (citing cases); 1 A-L.R.3d
571 (1965).
161. 40 AM. JuR. 2d Homicide § 302 (1968).
162. 84 Cal. App. 3d 294, 148 Cal. Rptr. 430 (1978).
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ered in evaluating the woman's perception of the situation. In
Bush, the lower court had given jury instructions emphasizing self-
defense in terms of "imminent danger" and "immediate circum-
stances,""' but had refused the defendant's request for a jury in-
struction regarding prior threats by the decedent. The California
Court of Appeal held that because the trial court's emphasis on
"immediate circumstances" may have diverted the jury's attention
from previous threats, it was reversible error to refuse to give the
requested instruction.1 " This instruction advised the jury that a
person who has received threats against her life by another "is jus-
tified in acting more quickly and taking harsher measures for her
own protection.., than would be a person who had not received
such threats."' 5
Although the Wanrow court did not explicitly go as far as the
Bush court in explaining the effect of prior threats on the woman's
perception, such reasoning is implicit hi the decision. Wanrow's
and Bush's consideration of all of the surrounding circumstances
also arguably includes the frustration engendered by past efforts
on the part of battered women to get police officers to arrest their
attackers"6 6 and prosecutors to pursue their cases.6 7 The surround-
ing circumstances also include the historical acceptance of wife
beating and the inadequacy of the criminal and civil remedies. All
of these factors influence the battered wife's perception of her lim-
ited options and her need to use self-defense.
Size and Strength Differences Must Be Considered
The second paragraph of the Wanrow jury instruction was
163. Id. at 303, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 436.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 303 n.2, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 435-36. The full text of the instruction provided:
"One who has received threats against her life or person made by another is justified in
acting more quickly and taking harsher measures for her own protection in the event of
assault either actual or threatened, than would be a person who had not received such
threats; and if in this case you believe from the evidence that the deceased made threats
against the defendant and that the defendant because of such threats made previously to
the transaction complained of had reasonable cause to fear greater peril in the event of an
altercation with the deceased than she would have otherwise, you are to take such facts and
circumstances into your consideration in determining whether the defendant acted in a
manner in which a reasonable person would act in protecting her own life or bodily safety."
Id.
166. See text accompanying notes 64-91 supra.
167. See text accompanying notes 97-105 supra.
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found to be equally prejudicial:
However, when there is no reasonable ground for the person at-
tacked to believe that his person is in imminent danger of death
or great bodily harm, and it appears to him that only an ordinary
battery is all that is intended, and all that he has reasonable
grounds to fear from his assailant, he has a right to stand his
ground and repel such threatened assault, yet he has no right to
repel a threatened assault with naked hands, by the use of a
deadly weapon in a deadly manner, unless he believes and has
reasonable grounds to believe, that he is in imminent danger of
death or great bodily harm.'"
The error in this part of the instruction was that it did not clearly
indicate to the jury that Wanrow's "subjective impressions" were
the measure of the reasonableness of her conduct. 16 9 According to
the court, the use of the male pronoun eight times in the para-
graph gave the jury the impression that the objective standard to
be applied was that applicable to a fight between two men of com-
parable size. Because Wanrow was 5'4" and using a crutch while
Wesler was 6'2" and intoxicated, it would be unreasonable, accord-
ing to the court, to expect Wanrow to fight off an attack by Wesler
without the use of a weapon. 17 0 This analysis is pertinent to the
reasonableness of the force element.
Traditionally, the courts have allowed guns to be used in self-
defense only when the attacker also had a gun.17 1 However, the
majority rule now is that "the relative size and strength of the ac-
cused and deceased are proper considerations in determining
whether there was reasonable apprehension of danger and whether
the slayer used more force than was necessary to defend himself
against the threatened danger.' 7 2 In People v. Reeves,17 3 another
battered wife self-defense case, the court stated: "It is a firmly
established rule that the aggressor need not have a weapon to jus-
tify one's use of deadly force in self-defense. . . and that a physi-
cal beating may qualify as such conduct that could cause great
168. 88 Wash. 2d at 239, 559 P.2d at 558.
169. Id. at 240, 559 P.2d at 558.
170. Id. This error was not cured by Instruction 12, which advised the jury to consider
"the relative size and strength of the persons involved." Id. at 246 n.11, 559 P.2d at 561 n.3
(Hamilton, J., dissenting).
171. See SCHNEIDER & JORDAN, supra note 144, at 14, 18.
172. 40 AM. JuR. 2d Homicide § 159 (1968). See id. § 291. See also People v. Collins,
189 Cal. App. 2d 575, 589-90, 11 Cal. Rptr. 504, 514 (1961).
173. 47 IMI. App. 3d 406, 362 N.E.2d 9 (1977).
[Vol. 32
BATTERED WIVES
bodily harm."1' 4
Subjective Perceptions of Women That Result From Sex Discrimi-
nation Must Be Considered
The Wanrow court also held that "[t]he persistent use of the
masculine gender" in the jury instruction violated Wanrow's right
to equal protection of the law,1 5 in that "the respondent was enti-
tled to have the jury consider her actions in light of her own per-
ceptions of the situation, including those perceptions which were
the product of our nation's 'long and unfortunate history of sex
discrimination.' ,,16
This language sweeps very broadly and could have far-reach-
ing implications. Because women, unlike most men, have never
been trained in fist-fighting techniques, when a woman is
threatened by a serious attack from a man, the only way that she
can defend herself is by resorting to a weapon. 77 The Wanrow
court thus implied that women should be permitted to resort to a
weapon under circumstances in which men would not be so permit-
ted, because in such circumstances men would be able to defend
themselves with their fists. The court acknowledged that sex dis-
crimination has both created the impression that it is improper for
women to engage in fist-fighting and in many cases denied women
exposure to fist-fighting techniques.
By implication, the court's language also includes any other
perceptions of the battered wife that are the result of sex discrimi-
nation. Logically, this would include such things as the battered
wife's emotional and economic dependency on her husband. All of
these considerations, from the battered wife's point of view, effec-
tively eliminate the option of leaving her husband and make strik-
ing out in self-defense her only alternative.
174. Id. at 411, 362 N.E.2d at 13.
175. The equal protection argument is technically dictum and is not well explained by
the court. For one hypothesis, see Note, Women's Self-Defense Under Washington Law, 54
WASH. L. R.v. 221, 225-28 (1978).
176. 88 Wash. 2d at 240, 559 P.2d at 559 (quoting Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S.
677, 684 (1973)). Benign sex discrimination cases also recognize the propriety of considering
historical sex discrimination. See, e.g., Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977); Schlesinger
v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975); Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974).
177. The court cites B. BABcocK, A FREEDMAN, E. NORTON & S. Ross, SEx DISCRIMINA-
TION AND THE LAW: CAUSES AND Emznss 943-1070 (1975), and S. BROWNMILER, AGAINST
OUR WILL: MEN, WOMEN AND RAPE (1975), as support for its reasoning. 88 Wash. 2d at 239
n.8, 559 P.2d at 558.
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The court's holding in Wanrow thus mandates that in order to
comply with the equal protection clause, the reasonableness of the
woman's belief in the necessity of using deadly force and in the
immediacy of the danger are to be evaluated in light of her own
subjective perceptions of the situation. More specifically, Wanrow
recognized that additional considerations are present in the bat-
tering situation that are absent from the traditional man-on-man
self-defense scenario. These added factors include the battered
wife's dependency which prevents her from leaving her husband,
the sex discrimination inherent in traditional attitudes of wives as
their husbands' property that still affect the response of police and
prosecutors, the frustration caused by the inadequacy of the pre-
sent legal remedies, and traditional notions that women are not
supposed to engage in physical confrontations.
The Immediacy Problem
One remaining problem that arises in battered wife self-de-
fense cases, not addressed in Wanrow, is the issue of whether the
battered wife reasonably believed that she was in immediate dan-
ger and that the force used was necessary to avoid the danger. This
issue arises when the battered wife kills her husband during a lull
in the beatings.
For example, in People v. Lucas,7 8 a battered wife killed her
husband before her husband performed an act which, in the court's
opinion, would have induced a reasonable belief that bodily injury
was about to be inflicted. The facts of Lucas show that Ms. Lucas
had been choked two or three times a month during the marriage
and that her husband had threatened to kill her on several occa-
sions.179 The court held that "threats alone, unaccompanied by
some act which induces in defendant a reasonable belief that bod-
ily injury is about to be inflicted, do not justify a homicide."' 80
Danger cannot be imminent, according to the Lucas court, in the
absence of an act on the part of the attacker. 8
A hypothetical will be used to illustrate how the immediacy
178. 160 Cal. App. 2d 305, 324 P.2d 933 (1958).
179. Id. at 307, 324 P.2d at 934.
180. Id. at 310, 324 P.2d at 936. The court ignores the fact that even according to its
version of the events, the decedent "came with his arms out" at his wife. Id. at 307, 324 P.2d
at 934.
181. Id. at 310, 324 P.2d at 936.
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problem arises. Suppose a woman has been subjected to physical
and sexual abuse during the course of a twenty year marriage. The
woman's husband leaves her but continues to threaten to kill her
and often follows her. On the day in question, the woman sees her
estranged husband standing outside her apartment building and
shoots and kills him. The husband is found to be unarmed.
In a situation such as the one outlined above, the legal prob-
lem is with the immediacy element because the husband was not
threatening or attacking the wife when she killed him. The issue
presented is whether the woman reasonably believed that she was
in immediate danger. Under present law she would not prevail on a
self-defense plea because the immediacy element of the self-de-
fense standard would not be met.
1 82
However, an argument can be made, founded on an under-
standing of the battered wife syndrome, that these actions did con-
stitute self-defense. The syndrome has been described as being
made up of three phases.18' During the first phase tension builds
and minor abuse occurs. The woman will try to make peace with
her husband to lessen her fear of more serious abuse that she
knows will follow. She may even blame herself for her husband's
conduct. Acute battering is characteristic of phase two, during
which the woman feels powerless to do anything to stop her hus-
band. When this stage ends the victim feels relieved that the vio-
lence is over, at least temporarily, and she forgives her assailant.
This is phase three; the calm, loving time.18
Evidence of the battered wife syndrome would be relevant in
states that follow the objective test for immediacy as well as in
states that use a subjective standard.8 5 In a state that applies the
182. W. LAFAvE & A. Scorr, HANDBOOK ON CP&INAL LAW § 53, at 394 (1972), sets out
the traditional immediacy test and rationale: "Case law and legislation concerning self-
defense require that the defendant reasonably believe his adversary's unlawful violence be
'imminent' or 'immediate.' If the threatened violence is scheduled to arrive in the more
distant future, there may be avenues open to the defendant to prevent it other than to kill
or injure the prospective attacker; but this is not so where the attack is imminent." See also
MODEL PENAL CODS § 3.04 (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1958) (referring to Appendix A for a list of
states' immediacy standards).
183. The originator of the battered wife syndrome is Lenore Walker. See generally L.
WALKER, THE BATTERED WomAN (1979).
184. K. RIDOLFI & C. ARGUEDAS, WOMEN'S SELF-DEFENSE CASES: JURYWORK AND LEGAL
STRATEGY 4-5 (1979). When Lenore Walker has testified or trained others to do so, 70-80%
of the women have been acquitted. Levine, Battered Lives, The Continuing Trials of Ber-
nadette Powell, The Village Voice, Dec. 24, 1979, at 29.
185. The Model Penal Code uses a subjective immediacy standard: "the use of force
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objective immediacy standard, an expert could testify as to the ex-
istence of the battered wife syndrome so that the jury could use
this information in determining whether the woman's belief in the
immediacy of the danger was reasonable. In a state that applies
the subjective immediacy standard, such testimony could be used
to show the woman's subjective belief in the immediacy of the
danger.
The battered wife syndrome analysis indicates that during the
first two stages, particularly in the second one, the woman is con-
sumed by fear and feels powerless to do anything to end the vio-
lence. This state has been termed "cumulative terror"188 by some
writers, and one attorney who represents battered women has
called the husband's constant battering "murder by install-
ment.1187 These terms accent the fact that the battered wife is con-
stantly in a heightened state of terror because she is certain that
one day her husband will kill her during the course of a beating.
The battered wife thus is literally faced with the dilemma of either
waiting for her husband to kill her or striking out at him first.188
On the basis of this three stage analysis, an argument can be
upon or toward another person is justifiable when the actor believes that such force is imme-
diately necessary for the purpose of protecting himself against the use of unlawful force by
such other person on the present occasion." MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(1) (Tent. Draft No.
8, 1958).
186. Note, Battered Wives Who Kill, Double Standard Out of Court, Single Standard
In?, 2 L. & HuMAN BEHAVIOR 133, 164 (1978). See also Potential Defense, supra note 2, at
229 ("cumulative heat of passion"); A Killing Excuse, TiME, Nov. 28, 1977, at 108 (quotes
Attorney Robert Ansell: "The cumulative effect of beatings on a woman's consciousness is
often considered.").
187. Eisenberg & Seymour, The Self-Defense Plea and Battered Women, TRIL., July
1978, at 41.
188. See, e.g., SCHNEIDER & JORDAN, supra note 144, at 8 ("In this context, a woman
who kills a man is not insane; she may be saving her own life."); Levine, Battered Lives,
The Continuing Trials of Bernadette Powell, The Village Voice, Dec. 24, 1979, at 29 (asked
by the District Attorney why she did not leave her husband sooner, Powell-a battered wife
who had killed her husband-replied: "I was scared he'd do worse, sir. Kill me even. Beat
me to death."); Lewin, Self-Defense for Battered Women-When Victims Kill, The Na-
tional Law Journal, Oct. 29, 1979, at 10 (quotes Professor Schneider: "Many of these wo-
men are literally killing to avoid being killed."); Scheier, Did Pat Evans Kill Her Husband
in Self-Defense?, CHICAGO LAW., Oct. 1979, at 19 (quotes Pat Evans: "He [her husband]
told me that he was gonna stay with us until the divorce was final and on that day kill us
all. I really felt he was gonna do us in." Also quotes Public Defender McCulloch: The bat-
tered woman is "protecting herself against what she perceives as a present or future life-
threatening act... her perceptions say that the only way to save her life is to strike out,
whether against the beating she is in the middle of or against the next one that will inevita-
bly come.").
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made that the facts of the hypothetical fulfill the immediacy re-
quirement of self-defense. Even though in the hypothetical the wo-
man's husband no longer lived with her, the woman was in a state
of cumulative terror because her husband continually threatened
to kill her. The past behavior of the husband indicated that he was
not bluffing, but was perfectly capable of carrying out his threat.
The woman's constant terror, like that of any battered wife, is
heightened by her negative experience with the legal system. The
typical battered wife has called the police on several occasions and
chances are that they have done little more than tell her husband
to walk around the block to cool off or advised the wife to spend
the night at a friend's house. If the battered wife has been able to
convince the police to arrest her husband, then she has been bur-
dened with the district attorney's pressure to drop the charges or a
mandatory diversion to the family bureau. If her case has survived
to trial and conviction, her husband probably received only a light
punishment. Perhaps the battered wife has gone through all the
paperwork and expense of getting a TRO only to have the police
tell her that they cannot enforce the order because it is a civil
matter.
It is easy to argue that all a battered wife has to do is to leave
her husband and her constant terror would end. But, emotional
and economic dependency as well as practical obstacles preclude
this easy option for some women. Furthermore, often the hus-
band's threats and beatings do not end when the woman moves
out. With all this in mind, the woman in the hypothetical knew
that she had exhausted her options and had to face the terrifying
reality that her husband was going to kill her eventually unless she
struck out first.
Thus, from the perspective of the battered wife, the danger is
constantly "immediate." Given this perspective, it makes little
sense for the law to excuse the wife's killing if it occurs while she is
being beaten, but to find her guilty of murder if she kills during a
temporary respite between beatings. In both instances the motive
may be the same-to prevent the eventuality of the wife's husband
killing her.
Apparently recognizing the fallacious reasoning behind a rigor-
ous immediacy requirement, the Model Penal Code demands
something less than traditional immediacy. The Comments ex-
plain: "The actor must believe that his defensive action is imme-
diately necessary and the unlawful force against which he defends
March 1981]
must be force that he apprehends will be used on the present occa-
sion, but he need not apprehend that it will be immediately
used."189 In the hypothetical, the woman's actions would probably
not come within the Model Penal Code's definition of immediacy,
because she did not necessarily apprehend that her husband was
going to use force on the particular occasion on which she killed
him. She just knew that eventually he would kill her, but she did
not know when. Nevertheless, the Model Penal Code formulation
of the rule does indicate a loosening of the traditional immediacy
standard, because under the Model Penal Code the actor must
only apprehend that force will be used on the occasion in question,
but not necessarily that force will be used "immediately."
Reactions to the Defense
Some commentators have predicted that a self-defense analy-
sis like the one outlined above will lead to "open season on
men."'' 9 Others believe that it is a simple recognition of the bat-
tered wife's perspective of the necessity of killing in order to avoid
being killed herself.' 9'
The assumption that this self-defense analysis will encourage
women to kill their husbands is an over reaction. These women are
only killing their husbands because they realize that there is no
other way to end the abuse. Battered women are not likely to kill
motivated by the assumption that they will be able to get away
189. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1958).
190. See Meyers, Battered Wives, Dead Husbands, STUDENT LAW., March 1978, at 47
(comment attributed to an attorney at a battered wife's trial). See also A Killing Excuse,
TIME Nov. 28, 1977, at 108 (quotes a sheriff: "I wonder if these people know what they're
doing. If they get their way, there's going to be a lot of killings."); Scheier, Did Pat Evans
Kill Her Husband in Self-Defense?, CHICAGO LAW., Oct. 1979, at 19 (quotes a New York
University law professor: "Acquittals encourage people to use killing as a remedy to their
problems rather than seek other means.").
191. See notes 186-87 & accompanying text supra. See also SCHNEIDER & JORDAN,
supra note 144, at 5 C'The crucial point to be conveyed.., is that, due to a variety of
societally based factors, a woman may reasonably perceive imminent and lethal danger in a
situation in which a man might not."); Eisenberg & Seymour, The Self-Defense Plea and
Battered Women, TRIAL, July 1978, at 42 ('To punish someone for obeying natural law and
protecting oneself seems to us to be highly hypocritical."); King, Right of Women to Self-
Defense Gaining in Battered Wife Cases, New York Times, May 7, 1979, at A18
('[F]eminists and others contend that acquittals in such cases constitute a simple recogni-
tion by jurors that the use of force, even deadly force, is justified to ward off a beating when
a pattern of repeated abuse is established."). See generally Note, Battered Wives Who Kill,
Double Standard Out of Court, Single Standard In?, 2 L. & HUMAN BEHAVIOR 133, 157-65
(1978).
[Vol. 32THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
BATTERED WIVES
with it. This self-defense analysis is a simple recognition of the
battered wife's perspective of her situation.
Conclusion
The battered wife syndrome is very complex and does not
yield to simple solutions. Many factors coalesce to foreclose to the
battered woman the obvious option of leaving her attacker. Histor-
ically, wife beating was viewed as the marital privilege of the hus-
band and at times even considered his duty. Slowly, this preroga-
tive has faded, but vestiges of it remain in the attitude that marital
privacy is to be preserved even at the cost of the wife's safety. The
attitude is reflected in police and prosecutor nonarrest and non-
prosecution strategies. Such prejudices, which are the product of
sex discrimination, are also evident in the battered wife's percep-
tion of herself-her low self esteem and her feeling that her sole
role is as a wife and mother.
Although sex discrimination and all that it causes can never
justify a battered wife killing her husband, the law of self-defense
must recognize the impact of such discrimination on the battered
wife's perception of her options. Therefore, in determining the rea-
sonableness of the battered wife's conduct when she kills her hus-
band, all of the surrounding circumstances, including those percep-
tions that derive from sex discrimination, must be evaluated.
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